

Judicial Communications Office

6 February 2025

IN THE MATTER OF AN INQUEST INTO THE DEATHS OF KEVIN BARRY O'DONNELL, PATRICK VINCENT, PETER CLANCY and SEAN O'FARRELL

SUMMARY OF CORONER'S VERDICTS AND FINDINGS

Introduction

Mr Justice Humphreys, presiding as Coroner, delivered his verdict and findings into the deaths of Kevin Barry O'Donnell (dob 24 March 1970 - aged 21 at time of death), Patrick Vincent (dob 17 July 1971 - aged 20), Peter Clancy (dob 31 October 1970 - aged 21) and Sean O'Farrell (dob 20 September 1969 - aged 22). The deaths occurred on 16 February 1992 in the grounds of St Patrick's Church, Clonoe near Coalisland, County Tyrone. The coroner found the men died as a result of gunshots fired by members of a Specialist Military Unit ("SMU"), a unit within the British Army. The Provisional IRA ("PIRA") issued a statement on 17 February 1992 stating that the four deceased were members of the East Tyrone Brigade and on active service at the time of their deaths. No inquest has previously been held into the deaths.

The coroner found that in each case, the use of lethal force was not justified. He said the soldiers did not have an honest belief that it was necessary in order to prevent loss of life and the use of force by the soldiers was, in the circumstances they believed them to be, not reasonable. The coroner also found that the operation was not planned and controlled in such a way as to minimise to the greatest extent possible the need for recourse to lethal force.

The evidence

In **Chapter 3** of his findings, the coroner outlined the structure of the security force operations in Northern Ireland in 1992. The planning and control of specific SMU operations for arrest and detention was the responsibility of the Officer Commanding ("OC") (in this case Colonel A) of the reactive sub-unit in conjunction with his team leader or ground commander. Colonel A gave evidence to the inquest that every soldier in the SMU was trained in the "Yellow Card" (the instructions on opening fire in Northern Ireland).

Chapter 7 deals with the intelligence and planning of the operation. In late 1991 intelligence was received by Special Branch of the RUC ("SB") that PIRA was planning a "spectacular attack" on a security force base in Tyrone, possibly using a lorry. On 15 February 1992 information was received to the effect that "a heavily armed gun team armed with a 12.7 heavy machine gun and 3 AKM rifles will attack Coalisland RUC station from the grounds of the chapel opposite the station." The intelligence also noted that a number of vehicles would be at the chapel car park after the attack to convey the weapons and personnel to a safe house. Meetings then took place including between Colonel A, Soldier A (the OC of the SMU reactive sub-unit) and the members of that unit. Captain A's statement from 1992 which was available to the inquest said the plan was to arrest the terrorists and prevent the attack on the RUC station. Soldier A said he was directed to go to the chapel with a patrol, take up position in a hedgerow adjacent to the chapel car park and monitor the area for terrorist activity. If persons arrived who appeared to be terrorists preparing to carry out a terrorist

Judicial Communications Office

attack, they were to be arrested. The use of firearms by Soldier A and his patrol was to be governed at all times by the Yellow Card. In Soldier A's evidence to the inquest he said the plan was to close in on the PIRA operatives and detain them as they assembled and mounted the heavy machine gun onto the vehicle in the chapel car park. The written orders drawn up by Soldier A were not available to the inquest with the coroner saying they were presumably destroyed by the SMU.

Chapter 8 deals with the events of 16 February 1992. At around 21:00 hours four masked men hijacked a lorry in Coalisland, welded an improvised metal pipe to the top and centre of the rear tailgate and attached a heavy Russian made DShK machine gun to it and drove it to Coalisland RUC station at around 22:40 hours where some 60 rounds were fired but no one was injured. The lorry proceeded to the chapel car park where the soldiers opened fire on its occupants and three other vehicles in the car park. The four deceased were shot dead shortly before 23:00 hours. Aidan McKeever was struck by 15 bullets and lay wounded beside a dark blue Cavalier in the car park. One soldier received a facial injury caused by a bullet. Two other Cavaliers drove off from the scene. One was owned by Martin Woods who received treatment in hospital on 17 February 1992 for a bullet wound to his right upper arm. The other Cavalier was burned out about a mile away. It had been struck by at least four bullets and all its seats were laid flat apart from that of the driver. This vehicle was owned by CC3. A total of 514 spent cartridges, attributable to the guns fired by the army were recovered from the scene. The chapel was struck 60 times. The lorry was struck by at least 68 bullets.

In **Chapter 9**, the coroner outlined the evidence given by 11 of the 12 soldiers who opened fire at the chapel car park (Soldier H absented himself and could not be located). Each of the soldiers exercised their lawful right to refuse to answer particular questions, invoking the privilege against self-incrimination contained in Rule 9 of the Coroners (Practice and Procedure) Rules (Northern Ireland) 1963. The former military witnesses ("FMW") did give evidence around the planning of, and preparation for, the operation. The inquest also had the benefit of interview notes and statements prepared during the police investigation in 1992-93.

A number of civilians also gave evidence (**Chapter 10**). Two of these witnesses were Martin Woods and Aidan McKeever who were present at the scene. Kevin Coney was medically excused from giving evidence to the inquest but in his 1992 statement to the police he said he was asked to attend the car park but he then left the scene and went to the pub. All three (Woods, McKeever and Coney) were charged with attempted murder and the possession of firearms with intent to endanger life. Each pleaded guilty in 1995 to assisting offenders and were sentenced to three years' imprisonment, suspended for three years. Aidan McKeever brought proceedings against the Ministry of Defence ("MOD") in 2010 seeking damages for assault, battery and trespass to the person. Only Soldier A testified at the hearing with the other soldiers who were available declining to go into the witness box. Soldier A admitted that when engaging with Aidan McKeever, who was driving away from the car park, he intended to kill. The judge described the remainder of Soldier A's version of events as "utterly implausible".

The findings of fact are contained in **Chapter 16**. The coroner said there was a factual dispute as to whether the SMU was aware of aspects of the intelligence information, particularly as to the intention of the PIRA operatives to return to the Clonoe chapel car park after the attack at Coalisland in order to disassemble and disperse. A SB brief dated 16 February 1992 contained a specific reference to the chapel car park being used, after the event, to enable vehicles to collect the weapons and personnel and take them to a safe house. The consistent evidence of the SMU soldiers who

Judicial Communications Office

carried out the planning of the operation, namely Colonel A and Soldier A, as well as others, was that this information was not shared by SB or TCG. The coroner commented:

“The NOK submitted that it makes no sense for such relevant and important information to have been withheld from the unit which was to carry out a dangerous operation. The PIRA unit was known to be well armed, with a particularly powerful and prestigious weapon, and the risks of engagement and the use of lethal force would have been apparent to all. It was plainly relevant for the SMU to know as much as possible about the intentions of the PIRA unit, before, during and after the attack on the RUC station. If, as transpired to be the case, a different location was used for forming up and assembling the DShK, the knowledge that the unit may use the chapel car park to disperse would have been vital information.

None of the SMU witnesses could think of a reason why the information would have been withheld from them. This is particularly so because the SMU would only become involved in operations when they were beyond the capability of the police or the regular army. The evidence of the SMU witnesses is supported by CP8, an HMSU Sergeant, who did not recall any reference to the chapel car park being used as a dispersal point.

It is clear from the evidence of Soldier A that the plan which was formulated was based on the use of the car park to form up. There is no evidence of any secondary or contingency plan based on the use of the car park after the Coalisland attack.”

The coroner said there was also some dispute about whether the names of potential PIRA operatives were disclosed by TCG to the SMU. He said that whilst such information may have its uses, those concerned in planning the operation were well aware of PIRA in Coalisland and had good reason to believe that O'Donnell and O'Farrell in particular were likely to be involved. The coroner said that, on balance, he had concluded that the intelligence information in relation to the potential use of the chapel car park as a disassembly and dispersal point was not shared by TCG with the SMU. The PSNI did not challenge the evidence of the SMU soldiers in relation to the provision of intelligence to them. No contemporaneous document or report casts any doubt on the position insofar as the availability of this intelligence is concerned.

In closing submissions, counsel for the FMWs attempted to make a case that there may have been shots fired by members of the PIRA unit at the car park, based on the 'flashes' seen by soldiers and the presence of spent cartridges in the rear of the lorry and near the burnt-out vehicle at Annagher Hill. It was also suggested that Soldier H may, in fact, have been struck by hostile incoming fire. In her evidence, Ann Kiernan, an expert in ballistics, said she could not discount the possibility that the cartridges from the AKM weapons were discharged at the car park. The coroner, however, said that the recovered weapons had their safety catches activated:

“It is wholly implausible that this would have occurred at the car park following an exchange of gunfire. There is no evidence of any AKM weapon being fired in an exchange of gunfire as stated in security and media reports. I find, as a matter

Judicial Communications Office

of fact, that no member of the PIRA unit opened fire at the Clonoe chapel car park. There was a disagreement between the ballistics and pathology experts as to whether the gunshot wound to Peter Clancy's armpit was properly regarded as an entrance or an exit wound. On balance, I prefer the opinion of Prof Crane on this issue, based as it is on the contemporaneous findings of Dr Carson who tracked the course of the bullet through the body into the neck tissue. I have therefore concluded that this was an entrance rather than an exit wound."

In **Chapter 17** the coroner set out his conclusions on the use of lethal force (set out in full below):

"[285] None of the soldiers who opened fire at Clonoe gave evidence to the inquest about their subjective beliefs at the time of so doing. The inquest did have the benefit of the notes of their interviews after caution and the police statements prepared some eight to ten months after the event. However, none of the assertions made to the police could be challenged in light of the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination by the witnesses.

[286] It is also palpably clear that there was no significant challenge of the accounts given by the FMWs by the police in interview. As DI Lyttle stated, these were just a record of their accounts of the incident.

[287] As I have made clear, this does not give rise to any adverse inference being drawn against any individual witness, or indeed the witnesses collectively, but it does result in a significant evidential gap insofar as the inquest is concerned.

[288] In order to ascertain if lethal force was justified, the inquest must first examine whether he who fired had an honest belief that he needed to use force to defend himself or others from unlawful violence. The second question is whether, in the circumstances which he believed existed at the time, the force used was reasonable.

[289] To answer these questions, it will be necessary to focus on those who may have inflicted lethal force. However, before doing so, there are a number of general points which arise.

[290] In the police interviews, only one of the twelve soldiers who opened fire referenced any intention to arrest the PIRA operatives. This was Soldier H who only mentioned it in the context of not giving a warning in advance of opening fire. He did not co-operate with the inquest.

[291] Secondly, several of the soldiers stated that when the lorry and car came into the car park they stood up, despite being aware that the PIRA unit was armed and in possession of a heavy machine gun. In those circumstances that course of action can only have exposed them to the risk of incoming fire. It is also difficult to reconcile with the statements to the effect that they believed their lives to be in danger.

[292] Furthermore, a number of highly trained SMU soldiers caused themselves to be illuminated in the headlights of the vehicles. This must have been an obvious risk during the hours of darkness when the vehicles arrived. If the reactive sub-unit

Judicial Communications Office

intended to surprise the PIRA unit and effect arrests, this course of action was inimical to that aim.

[293] Four of the soldiers (B, D, J and K) told the police that they saw 'muzzle flashes' coming from the lorry and believed that there was incoming fire. The inquest was not able to scrutinise whether highly trained soldiers ought to be able to distinguish between flashes caused by bullets striking a vehicle from those caused by the firing of AKM rifles or a DShK.

[294] Seven of the soldiers, namely A, D, F, G, I, J and L all admitted to the police that they shot at vehicles exiting the car park and/or persons fleeing the scene.

[295] Three soldiers, including Soldier A, gave an account of the driver of the dark Cavalier adopting a firing stance by the vehicle and this led to further shots being fired. It later transpired that he was unarmed. This version of events was dismissed by Treacy J in the civil action as being utterly implausible.

[296] It is evident that there was no attempt to arrest any occupant of the lorry or the other vehicles in the car park. The radio log entry just minutes after the shootings is instructive. It states:

"... we saw truck with 12.7 with 2 B didn't challenge as no cover we engaged truck."

[297] This lack of cover was an issue which prompted the inquiry from the DPP in September 1992 and was also referenced by DS Hart in his report. This is integral to the planning of the operation but is also relevant to the conduct of the soldiers when faced by the arrival of the lorry into the car park.

[298] Even absent the specific intelligence about the use of the car park as a point of dispersal, it must have been evident to experienced soldiers that the PIRA unit needed to dismount the DShK from the lorry and remove it to a safe place. The risk of a firefight involving such a weapon would have been significantly reduced by waiting for a short time for this disassembly to commence. Equally, the ability to arrest the suspects would have been substantially improved.

[299] The soldiers chose not to wait for this outcome but to stand up and open fire on the occupants of the lorry and the drivers of the cars.

[300] It must be recognised that the Yellow Card is not a statement of the law but nonetheless it provides important guidance on the use of firearms and lethal force and all the soldiers recognised it as the basis for engaging with an enemy. The Yellow Card makes it clear that the use of firearms must be a last resort and that a challenge must be given before opening fire unless either doing so would increase the risk of death or serious injury or the soldier or his colleagues are already being engaged by terrorists.

[301] The guidance goes on to say that you may only open fire where the person is committing or about to commit an act likely to endanger life and there is no other way to prevent the danger. One example given of such danger is where a person is firing or

Judicial Communications Office

is about to fire a weapon. When one has to open fire, the Yellow Card states that only aimed shots should be fired and no more rounds than are necessary.

[302] The indisputable circumstances of the incident at Clonoe are that:

- (i) No challenge was given;
- (ii) No person fired on the soldiers;
- (iii) Automatic fire was used as well as aimed shots;
- (iv) One of the deceased was shot in the back whilst running away; and
- (v) At least 514, and up to 570, rounds were fired by the soldiers.

[303] However, it is necessary to analyse the use of lethal force in each individual case. The focus of the inquest must be on the deaths and the use of force which caused or contributed to those deaths. I undertake this task on the basis of all the available evidence, including the statements and interviews of the soldiers and the expert ballistic and pathology reports.

[304] This evidence points clearly to the conclusion that the fatal shots were not fired during the initial burst of gunfire which emanated from the soldiers at the hedgerow. As such, these events provide important narrative and context to what ensued thereafter but do not answer the question as to whether any use of lethal force was justified.

[305] I have concluded, on balance, that Kevin Barry O'Donnell was shot first through the lower right flank. The trajectory of the bullet indicates that he was shot when his back was to the shooter and at a time when the shooter was at a level lower than the deceased, such as when he was dismounting the lorry. The shot to the head was inflicted later and not from the same position given the route taken by the bullet. The likelihood is that the shot to the head was inflicted after O'Donnell was lying incapacitated on the grass near the lorry.

[306] Kevin Barry O'Donnell was one of the occupants of the rear of the lorry and most, if not all, of the soldiers aimed their initial fire at them. However, given that he was first shot when descending from the lorry, I find that he was first struck by a bullet fired by Soldier F, as he admits in his police interview.

[307] Both Soldier F and Soldier H in their police statements make unequivocal admissions that they engaged two men when they were on the ground by the lorry. The head shot which killed O'Donnell was, on the balance of probability, inflicted by one of these two soldiers whilst he was on the ground.

[308] O'Donnell was in possession of an AKM rifle whilst on the lorry. Whilst it was subsequently found to be in the 'safe' position, this would not have been known to the soldiers. In his statement, Soldier F says that he opened fire initially when he believed the occupants of the lorry were about to open fire on the patrol. However, when he moved forward and approached the lorry, the four men he observed were not aiming any weapons at him or his colleagues but were attempting to descend and run away. This is consistent with O'Donnell being shot in the back – at that time he could not have presented a threat to Soldier F.

Judicial Communications Office

[309] Soldiers F and H made the case to the police that they engaged the two terrorists on the ground because they had weapons within reach and he still perceived them to be a threat. By the time he was on the ground, O'Donnell had sustained a serious and incapacitating injury from a high velocity bullet.

[310] In those circumstances, I reject the claim that these soldiers had an honest belief that they needed to use force, which was inevitably going to be lethal, in order to defend themselves or others. The reality must have been obvious to them that O'Donnell presented no viable threat in either situation.

[311] Peter Clancy was struck by multiple rounds. He was also dismounting the lorry when Soldier F claims his fire struck him and he fell down. There was considerable variation in the tracks of the bullets, indicating that he was struck from different directions. The trajectory of a number of the bullets was such that they must have been inflicted when he was in a kneeling or crouching position.

[312] Four soldiers, namely B, D, F and H admitted in interview that they shot Clancy when he was on the ground. The bullet entrance wound identified at the right axilla is suggestive of the deceased having his hands in the air at the time he was shot.

[313] The fatal injuries to Clancy were caused firstly when he was dismounting the lorry and secondly when he was shot repeatedly whilst incapacitated on the ground, in a kneeling or crouched position. He presented no threat to anyone and I reject the claim advanced by the soldiers that they had an honest belief that lethal force was required to be used to defend themselves or others. It is not possible to say which of the four soldiers fired the fatal shot which killed Peter Clancy.

[314] Patrick Vincent, the driver of the lorry, was struck by numerous bullets, some of which were fired through the driver's door. However, he had two injuries consistent with being shot through the open driver's door and the open passenger door. He was lying down when he received these shots.

[315] On balance, I find that Vincent was injured within the cab of the lorry when the doors were opened by soldiers and shots fired, inflicting fatal injuries. The justification offered by the shooters for their actions was that they were aware of movement or noise within the cab of the lorry.

[316] Soldiers B, C and F all admitted shooting into the cab of the lorry but none mentioned either opening the doors or the doors being open. Soldier C mentions a colleague opening the door after he had shot inside. It was not possible to test their accounts at the inquest due to the invocation of the privilege.

[317] I reject the claims advanced that these soldiers held an honest belief that lethal force was required in these circumstances to defend themselves or others. Patrick Vincent was lying down, wholly incapacitated within the cab of the lorry, when the fatal shots were fired. It is not possible to say which of Soldiers B, C or F inflicted the shot which killed him.

Judicial Communications Office

[318] Sean O'Farrell was shot in the back by Soldier L when he was running away and posed no threat to anyone. This caused him to collapse and, in the opinion of Prof Crane, was capable of little voluntary movement thereafter. One of the bullets had caused serious damage to his right arm. Soldier L told the police that O'Farrell was running in such a way that he believed he was carrying a weapon. He did not, however, make any case that he believed his life, or the life of anyone else, was in danger.

[319] Soldier H proceeded to shoot O'Farrell three times in the face while he was lying on the ground. Soldier D had already seen him on the ground and felt no need to engage this individual. Soldier H gave an account to the police that he could see the man on the ground "go for a metal object" and felt he was going for a weapon. This is despite the serious injury which he had received to his right arm.

[320] Given the condition which O'Farrell was in as he lay on the ground, I reject Soldier H's contention that he had an honest belief that the use of lethal force was required either to defend himself or others.

[321] No attempt was made by the soldiers to arrest any of the members of the PIRA unit, even as they lay seriously injured and incapacitated either on the ground or in the cab of the lorry.

[322] I have found, in each case, that the soldiers concerned did not have an honest and genuinely held belief that the use of force was necessary to defend themselves or others. It follows that use of force cannot have been reasonable.

[323] The findings of this inquest are that the deceased were shot by members of the SMU:

- (i) O'Donnell - in the back whilst attempting to flee and in the face whilst lying incapacitated on the ground;
- (ii) Clancy - whilst attempting to flee and then repeatedly whilst in a crouched or kneeling position on the ground;
- (iii) Vincent - whilst seated in the cab of the lorry and then when lying incapacitated across the seat of the lorry through its open doors; and
- (iv) O'Farrell - in the back whilst running away and then in the face whilst lying on the ground incapacitated.

[324] The use of lethal force was not justified at Clonoe on 16 February 1992."

Chapter 18 contains the coroner's conclusions on the planning of the operation. He said that in light of his finding of fact relating to the sharing of intelligence information, it was apparent that the plan was conceived in circumstances where not all the pertinent details were known. He said that those who formulated the plan made it clear that intelligence to the effect that the PIRA unit would use the chapel car park to disperse would have been of real significance. In the event, and for whatever reason, this information was not shared by TCG. That alone constituted a serious flaw in the planning of the operation. The coroner's conclusions are set out in full below:

Judicial Communications Office

[327] Soldier A gave evidence that he carried out recces of the chapel car park and identified the southern boundary of the car park as the only suitable place to locate the patrol. This was despite the fact that he assessed the cover as being “poor.” The operation was to take place at night and the PIRA unit would be using vehicles. The likelihood, or possibility at least, of soldiers being ‘skylined’ and identified must have been an obvious consideration.

[328] The lack of any hard cover meant that this could not properly be described as a covert operation. The plan, as formulated, relied upon being able to surprise the PIRA unit when they were mounting the DShK and then to effect arrests. If, however, the PIRA unit arrived with the DShK already mounted, there was no alternative or contingency plan. In such circumstances, the SMU sub-unit would simply have to react to events as they unfolded, under the leadership on the ground of Soldier A.

[329] The actions of Soldier A are therefore of significance. There is nothing on the radio logs to indicate that he gave instructions to the unit to act in a particular manner once the unanticipated had occurred. Instead, when the lorry arrived at the car park, he stood up, thereby breaking cover. This had the inevitable effect of significantly increasing the likelihood of engagement and therefore the use of lethal force. It should have been obvious to him, as the ground commander, that the PIRA unit would have to dismount the DShK from the lorry and place it into another vehicle in order to secure it and move it away from the scene. He could therefore have ordered his men to wait until these steps were being taken, which would have reflected the intention of the original plan. Instead, he and others stood up and opened fire on the lorry.

[330] This must cast doubt on whether, in fact, this was an arrest operation at all. It should be recalled that only one of the twelve soldiers mentioned the possibility of arresting suspects in the course of police interviews. Equally, none of the soldiers even contemplated effecting an arrest at any stage, including when the deceased were lying incapacitated on the ground or slumped across the seat in the cab of the lorry.

[331] It is also noteworthy that the terminology of “ambush” appears frequently in both PSNI and MOD documents created after the event. Colonel A explained that, in the military context, ‘ambush’ has a particular meaning. It entails placing your enemies within a ‘killing zone’, with cut off groups on the outskirts to prevent any escape. Firepower is then unleashed on those within the killing zone. His evidence was that ambushes were not carried out in Northern Ireland. If that were the case, it is difficult to understand why experienced police and military officers would use that language.

[332] It is also the case that agencies of the state perpetuated falsehoods about the events which unfolded at Clonoe. The initial press release referred to an “exchange of gunfire”, thereby ensuring that this was the narrative conveyed by the media. No steps were taken to rectify this and ensure that the public were made aware of a true account of events. Indeed, in submissions made to the inquest, wholly implausible attempts continue to be made to assert that members of the PIRA unit opened fire at the car park. This demonstrably did not happen.

Judicial Communications Office

[333] Reports created by the SMU and the PSNI in the aftermath, including those provided to Government Ministers, referred to “simultaneous firing” and a “fire-fight”, statements which were demonstrably untrue and must have been known to be untrue.

[334] The reasons for putting forward such false justifications for the actions of the soldiers are obvious. This, coupled with a lack of any proper challenge of their accounts by the RUC investigators, ensured there would be no actual accountability.

[335] The attitude of the state agencies to the events at Clonoe, where four men lost their lives, is best summarised by the MOD report of 24 April 1992, where the operation is referred to as:

“an excellent Security Forces success.”

[336] This operation was not planned and controlled in such a manner as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, the need to have recourse to lethal force. Indeed, as is illustrated by the actions of the soldiers and the events which unfolded, the use of lethal force against the PIRA unit was the likely outcome of the operation.”

Chapter 19: The Verdict

“The deceased were:

- Kevin Barry O’Donnell, born in Dungannon on 24 March 1970, from Coalisland, Co Tyrone;
- Patrick Vincent, born in Dungannon on 17 July 1971, and from Dungannon, Co Tyrone;
- Peter Clancy, born in Dungannon on 31 October 1970, and from Coalisland, Co Tyrone; and
- Sean O’Farrell, born in Dungannon on 20 September 1969 and from Coalisland, Co Tyrone.

Each of the deceased died around 22:50 hours on 16 February 1992 at St Patrick’s Chapel, Clonoe, Co Tyrone.

Kevin Barry O’Donnell died as a result of gunshot wounds to the head and chest. The fatal shots were fired by either Soldier F or Soldier H.

Patrick Vincent died as a result of gunshot wounds to the head. The fatal shots were fired by either Soldier B, C or F.

Peter Clancy died as a result of a gunshot wounds to the head and trunk. The fatal shots were fired by Soldiers B, D, F or H.

Sean O’Farrell died as a result of gunshot wounds to the head and trunk. He was killed by shots fired by Soldier H, having previously been shot and wounded by Soldier L.

Judicial Communications Office

In each case, the use of lethal force was not justified. The soldiers did not have an honest belief that it was necessary in order to prevent loss of life and the use of force by the soldiers was, in the circumstances they believed them to be, not reasonable.

The operation was not planned and controlled in such a way as to minimise to the greatest extent possible the need for recourse to lethal force.”

NOTES TO EDITORS

1. This summary should be read together with the findings and should not be read in isolation. Nothing said in this summary adds to or amends the findings. The full findings will be available on the Judiciary NI website (<https://judiciaryni.uk>).

ENDS

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